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PANEL II: REVISITING THE
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
INCOME TAXATION
PRINCIPAL PAPERS
SOVEREIGNTY, ENTITLEMENT, AND
COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION
Peggy B. Musgrave*
I. INTRODUCTION
As its title suggests, this paper deals with certain aspects
of international tax policy which range outside the more tradi-
tional concerns of most economic discussion of the subject. But
since this is a law school symposium, I am bold enough to
think that the legal scholars among you will find it of some
interest. Furthermore, experience has convinced me that these
aspects play a large role in the shaping of unilateral, bilateral,
and multilateral tax arrangements and therefore deserve to be
thought about systematically. This is likely to be increasingly
the case in a world economy which promises to become ever
more closely integrated, and with administrative challenges
associated with new technologies.
While the paper discusses principles which are relevant to
all taxes which apply to investment, goods, and services mov-
* The author is an Emerita Professor of Economics at the University of
California at Santa Cruz. She has also served as Research Associate at the Inter-
national Tax Program, Harvard University and as a Visiting Ford Research Profes-
sor at the University of California at Berkeley. She also has taught at Vassar
College, Northeastern University and the University of Pennsylvania. Professor
Musgrave has published numerous articles and essays on international tax issues,
including a recent article in the Tax Law Review entitled "Consumption Tax Pro-
posals in an International Setting." She received her undergraduate education at
Cambridge University and her graduate degrees from American University and
The Johns Hopkins University.
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ing across national boundaries, focus is on income taxation,
although the paper concludes with some brief comments on
consumption taxation. Furthermore, the discussion centers on
the taxation of income generated by direct investment abroad,
in particular direct investment by corporations. Consequently,
the corporation income tax is the primary focus with some
attention given to the individual income tax on dividends.
There are two universally recognized and widely practiced
national entitlements to tax income in an open economy set-
ting. One such entitlement adheres to the country of source of
income and the other to the country of residence' of the in-
come recipient. The economic consequences of the interaction of
these entitlements will differ in settings of conflict and cooper-
ation.
II. TAX SOVEREIGNTY OF THE RESIDENCE COUNTRY
I begin with the proposition that so long as there are na-
tion states serving populations with common purposes and
interests, such states will wish to retain a degree of sovereign-
ty over the tax treatment of the income-earning activities
abroad of their residents. Indeed, this national right to tax the
global income of residents is recognized in international law.2
Residents are held to owe tax allegiance in return for the
rights and privileges which they receive as residents, giving
rise to what is commonly referred to as the "residence princi-
ple." Exercise of this tax sovereignty over foreign source in-
come also is necessary to achieve equitable tax treatment of
resident taxpayers by making all income, wherever earned,
subject to tax, consistent with the accretion principle. It also is
needed to provide a policy instrument for affecting the outflow
of capital in line with national policy objectives. It also may be
justified in benefit terms, as a payment for productivity-en-
hancing benefits provided by the country of residence to its
own factors of production prior to transfer abroad. What is
important is that the country of residence is the residual tax-
1. The United States also includes citizenship with residency as bases for its
right to tax individuals. See infra note 10, for the conditions establishing the resi-
dency of the corporation.
2. An extensive discussion of the international legal basis for residence and
source taxation is given in Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of Inter-
national Income, 29 No. 2 LAW & POLY IN'VL Bus. 145, 148 (1998).
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ing authority and thus has sovereignty over the total tax bur-
den on the foreign-source income of its resident taxpayers.
A. Policy Options and Goals in Absence of Cooperation
The residence (home) country then has various choices
with regard to its treatment of the host country's tax on that
income: (1) it may make no allowance for such tax, applying its
own tax on foreign income gross of foreign tax; (2) it may apply
its tax on foreign income net of the foreign tax (treating the
latter in effect as a deduction); (3) it may allow full or limited
crediting of the foreign tax, treating the latter as its own; or,
(4) it can choose to surrender its tax sovereignty over the for-
eign income of its residents, exempting it from its own tax. In
addition, in the first three cases, taxation may be deferred
until foreign earnings are repatriated as dividends.3 Each of
these rules will have very different consequences for the
taxpayer's behavior and in turn for the amount and direction
of capital outflow. There is extensive literature which deals
with the theoretical and empirical aspects of these effects,4 but
which will not be discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say that
application of (1) would serve as a strong deterrent to capital
outflow, application of (2) would ensure that the national re-
turn on investment made abroad (net of foreign tax) will not
fall below the gross rate of return on domestic investment,'
and application of (3) as a full credit would secure an efficient
international allocation of investment,6 even though the na-
tional return to foreign investment (net of foreign tax) may in
3. The U.S. defers tax, with certain restrictions, for undistributed earnings of
foreign incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, but not of unincorporated
foreign branches of U.S. firms.
4. See, e.g., David G. Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment, 26
J. PUB. ECON. 116 (1985); Hans-Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Birth of Foreign
Subsidiaries, in TRADE, WELFARE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (H. Herberg & N. V.
Long eds., University of Michigan Press 1993); James R. Hines, Jr., Credit and
Deferral as International Investment Incentives, 55 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1994); Harry
Grubert, Taxes and the Division of Foreign Operating Income among Royalties,
Interest, Dividends and Retained Earnings, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 269 (1998).
5. See PEGGY B. RICHMAN (MUSGRAVE), TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
INCOME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Johns Hopkins Press, 1963). See also Martin S.
Feldstein & David G. Hartman, The Optimal Taxation of Foreign Source Invest-
ment Income, 93 Q. J. ECON. 613 (1979).
6. See Joel. Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation, 2 INT'L
TAX & PUB. FIN. 471 (1995).
20011 1337
BROOK. J. INTL L.
this case fall short of the national return to domestic invest-
ment (gross of domestic tax).7 Put another way, the foreign tax
credit implies a substantial revenue sacrifice by the country of
residence to satisfy an international efficiency standard.
The choice by the country of residence (hereinafter re-
ferred to as R) of how to exercise its tax sovereignty is, there-
fore, largely a choice of how its own tax is to relate to the tax
imposed by the country of source (hereinafter referred to as S).
Acting unilaterally, in the absence of cooperation, the principal
considerations in making that choice are equitable tax treat-
ment for its residents/citizens and its national economic inter-
ests. Such interests include the level and growth of national
income, the distribution of such income, and its balance of pay-
ments with the rest of the world; the latter bearing on its ex-
change rate and its terms of trade.8
B. Taxpayer Equity
The basic consideration for the residence country is to
preserve the integrity of its comprehensive income tax. Integri-
ty of such a tax system requires the inclusion of all income
earned abroad by R's residents 'n the tax base and subjecting
it to national standards of tax equity. Without that basic pro-
vision, standards of both horizontal and vertical equity are
violated. For individuals, the exercise of the residence entitle-
ment suggests the use of a personalized income tax-in con-
trast, as will be discussed later, to an impersonal tax-called
for exercising source entitlement. However, a rule for the equi-
table treatment of the foreign income taxes paid on that in-
come is not clear cut, since a case can be made for either cred-
iting, deducting, or even disregarding the foreign S tax.9 Full
crediting for the foreign tax is called for if an "international"
view of taxpayer equity is taken, with the foreign tax regarded
as equivalent to, and substitutable for, the domestic tax. On
7. See PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 130 (1969).
8. In a 1993 report, the U.S. Treasury proposed five international tax policy
objectives: simplicity of compliance and administration, preservation of the U.S. tax
base, consistency with international standards, economic efficiency and competitive-
ness. See Treasury Report on International Tax Reform, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 269
(1993). Needless to point out, there are likely to be inherent confficts among these
national objectives.
9. See Musgrave, supra note 7.
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the other hand, country R might define taxpayer equity in
"national" terms. In this case, the S tax could be regarded as a
cost to the taxpayer and, therefore, deducted from taxable
foreign income, just as lower level domestic taxes usually are
treated. Yet again, the definition of national equity might well
disregard the foreign tax entirely, with R's tax applied to for-
eign income gross of the foreign tax with no allowance for the
latter, on the ground that the standard of taxpayer equity
should be applied to R's tax only and that the foreign tax is
irrelevant in this regard. Which rule is followed, as in most
other equity issues, has to be a matter of judgment by national
consensus.
Although the concept of equity is more readily applied to
individual taxpayers, the corporation is an essential halfway
house for foreign income flowing to resident individual share-
holders and similar principles should apply to its taxation. For
resident corporations,'0 these again call for a corporation tax
which includes all income-foreign and domestic. For reasons
familiar in the context of domestic taxation, both efficiency and
equity call for taxation of corporations on an accrual basis
without deferral until distribution. This applies to income
earned abroad by the resident corporation, whether arising in
a foreign affiliate or branch, or foreign-incorporated subsidiary
form." But again on equity grounds, there is no definitive
rule as to the treatment of foreign tax.
C. National Economic Interests
The transference of economic activity abroad may have a
profound effect on the national economic interests of the resi-
dence country. None looms larger in this respect than overseas
investment which affects the overall level and distribution of
10. The question arises, how is "residency" of the corporation to be defined? Is
it country of registration, of principle management, or of majority shareholder
residence? The U.S. rules define it as the country where the corporation is regis-
tered or incorporated. But see infra note 11.
11. Under the definition of "residency" of the corporation as country of incor-
poration, a conflict arises between the residence taxation by the country of parent
corporation and residence taxation by the country of incorporation of the subsid-
iary. The U.S., with some notable exceptions, resolves this conflict by taxing only
the earnings of foreign-incorporated subsidiaries when remitted to the U.S. parent,
thus giving rise to a substantial tax preference to investment in low-tax jurisdic-
tions abroad by way of deferral of U.S. tax.
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national income within the capital-exporting country. Conse-
quently, tax policies which affect capital outflows are an impor-
tant instrument of economic policy. Countries of residence can
shape their tax policy to manipulate the size and type of capi-
tal outflow to their own advantage, rather than contribute to
the worldwide gains obtained through a neutral tax policy,
which promotes efficient international allocation of capital, 2
or redistributional considerations calling for investment in the
low-income countries.
Viewing the treatment of foreign taxes in national efficien-
cy terms, it will be to R's advantage to maximize the contribu-
tion of investment made abroad to the national welfare. It then
may seek to ensure that the national returns to investment
made abroad are at least equal to those obtained on domestic
investment. Since the foreign tax may be regarded as a sub-
traction from the national return, this goal of national efficien-
cy is secured by allowing foreign income taxes as deductions
from taxable income rather than as credits against the home
country tax. 3 Under this regime, investors will be inclined to
invest abroad only if returns after foreign tax are equal to or
greater than those obtainable before tax in the domestic econo-
my. In this way, investment made abroad will be less than
that called for on. worldwide efficiency grounds, but will be
consistent with a standard of national efficiency imposed by
the country of residence.
There is a further national argument which can be made
by R for the deduction treatment of foreign taxes. Provided
that the combined effective tax rate of R and S on investment
made abroad is similar to that on R's domestic investment, the
net result will be an overall increase in the combined national
income of R and S. However, the general assumption in neo-
classical economics is that the decision of investors resident in
country R, to invest R's savings in country S (the country of
source of income), rather than in R, will raise the income of R's
investors and S's labor, while lowering that of S's investors
and R's labor. Thus, even if tax neutrality ensures efficiency
with overall income gains, there will be redistributive effects in
12. See James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational
Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1997).
13. See Richman, supra note 5.
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both R and S (presumably equalizing in S and the reverse in
R). Furthermore, allowing for the tax take of country S in
foreign investment earnings, there well may be a net income
loss to the capital-exporting country R, with the presumption
of larger income gains to S.14 Since direct investment abroad
has powerful redistributive effects within and among partici-
pating countries, in terms of capital and labor earnings as well
as sources of tax revenue, it is to be expected that the country
of residence would wish to exercise some degree of control over
such investment. Short run effects of capital outflow on the
balance of payments may be a further concern for the home
country R.
Thus, just as it generally is accepted that a country has
,the right to retain sovereignty over population immigration, it
also is logical that sovereignty be exercised over the outflow of
its capital. In the absence of direct capital controls, taxation is
the favored instrument, and in particular the corporation in-
come tax. Furthermore, it follows that pursuit of national in-
terests generally will result in a tax penalty on investment
made abroad by the country of residence.
III. TAX ENTITLEMENT OF SOURCE COUNTRY
While nations, in practice, do not always exercise their full
tax sovereignty as countries of residence, choosing to exempt
foreign income or to tax it only when repatriated, most coun-
tries claim their entitlement to tax the income arising within
their borders but accruing to foreign investors. Indeed, this
entitlement to tax at source is the bedrock of most internation-
al tax treaties. The right of a jurisdiction to tax all income
arising within its geographical borders is recognized as a fun-
damental entitlement. This permits a country to share in the
gains of foreign-owned factors of production operating within
its borders; gains which are generated in cooperation with its
own factors, whether they be natural resources, an educated
and/or low-cost work force, or the proximity of a market. The
tax revenue so obtained may be thought of as a national return
to the leasing of these complementary factors to non-resident
investors or temporary workers, or, such taxation may be
thought of in benefit terms, as a quid pro quo payment for
14. See id.
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cost-reducing, profit-enhancing services provided by the host
country.
A. Policy Options and Goals in Absence of Cooperation
In exercising its entitlement, the country of source re-
quires an in rem or impersonal form of taxation, since a per-
sonal form of income taxation is not appropriate to a situation
in which only part of the taxpayer's global income is to be
taxed and the taxing authority is entitled to such income
earned only within its own borders. Source taxation of income
is, therefore, best implemented by a corporation income tax, a
payroll tax (in the case of labor income), withholding taxes, or
an income-type value-added tax based on the origin princi-
ple. 5 In applying the chosen tax, the source jurisdiction has
two primary instruments in exercising its entitlement to tax
income accruing to non-residents. One is its definition of
source, which in turn determines its share in the tax base, and
the other is the tax rate which it applies to that share of the
base. In the absence of international treaty rules, each source
country can choose policy options with respect to each aspect to
serve its own interests.
1. Division of Tax Base
Corporations resident in R and investing in S usually
derive income not only from operations in S, but also from
other countries of source (of which R itself is one). Consequent-
ly, each S has to determine what share of the worldwide prof-
its of the multi-national corporation can be claimed by it for
tax purposes. In other words, the total profits tax base has to
be divided among and assigned to the various countries in
which such profits had their source. The current international
practice of assigning the profits of a multi-national company to
separate business entities operating in source countries by
means of unilateral separate accounting is proving to be in-
creasingly arbitrary as international business operations be-
come more intertwined and integrated with shared costs and
overheads, and other interdependencies. 6 In the absence of
15. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Consumption Tax Proposals in an International
Setting, 54 TAX L. REV. 77 (2000).
16. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Defining a Unitary Business: An Economist's
[Vol. XXV:41342
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international agreements to the contrary, each source country
will adopt accounting rules and transfer pricing which assign
to it as large a share of the base as is possible. With each
country following its own source rules, both gaps and overlaps
in the assignment of the tax base may result.
2. Rate of Tax
The tax claim of the source country is a product of both its
claim to base and the rate of tax which it applies. The latter
involves both the corporation tax on basic profits and the with-
holding tax applied to the remitted dividends. In the absence of
treaty agreements, the choice of rates may be subject to con-
flicting purposes, namely the desire (1) to capture as large a
tax share of profits and dividends accruing to non-residents as
possible, and (2) to attract as large an inflow of capital as pos-
sible by offering tax incentives. This trade-off can, to some
extent, be avoided by offering profits tax incentives to attract
incoming investment, while applying relatively high withhold-
ing rates to encourage reinvestment of earnings.'
B. Tax Competition
This pattern of tax behavior by the countries of source can
lead to tax competition among capital-importing countries with
the result that no one country can obtain enough additional
investment from abroad to justify the lower tax. Furthermore,
such tax competition can have damaging effects on domestic
tax equity and possibly on the conduct of the public sector if
the tax incentives offered to non-resident investors have to be
extended to domestic investors." This especially will be the
case where the country of residence either exempts foreign
income from tax or treats foreign income taxes as deductible
costs. These are highly relevant problems for the developing
countries where foreign capital is needed for the development
View, in THE STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAX: ISSUES IN WORLDWIDE UNITARY
COMBINATION 89 (C.E. McLure, Jr. ed., Hoover Institution Press 1984).
17. Those countries which depend heavily on investment inflow from one par-
ticular capital exporter which offers a foreign tax credit, often adopt "soak-up" tax
rates which just absorb the credit.
18. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Merits and Demerits of Fiscal Competition, in
PUBLIC FINANCE WITH SEVERAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 281 (R. Prud'homme ed.,
1991).
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process, yet government revenue also is needed to create the
infrastructure for that development.
IV. COOPERATION
A. Need for Cooperative Rules
In the absence of international agreements and treaties, it
is evident that the taxation of foreign income earned by resi-
dents and of domestic income earned by non-residents, can
raise problems of inefficiency in the allocation of foreign invest-
ment and predatory inequities in the tax shares of that in-
come. Cooperative rules are needed both for reasons of econom-
ic efficiency and inter-nation equity. Cooperation also is essen-
tial for administrative reasons, in particular for reporting pur-
poses. Such cooperation can take various forms. It may be
represented by the current network of bilateral tax treaties
between countries of residence and source; which broadly fol-
lows an internationally accepted model tax treaty format. 9
Such tax treaties might be supplemented by multilateral
agreements, particularly among countries of source to prescribe
rules for the division of base and rates of tax. Finally, for rea-
sons discussed below, a higher degree of international coopera-
tion may be called for which assigns certain taxes, such as the
corporation income tax, to an international tax authority.
B. Inter-nation Equity
As it has been argued elsewhere, the share of base and tax
rate applied to that share by the countries of source should be
viewed as a matter of inter-nation equity calling for interna-
tional cooperation.0
1. Share of Tax Base
In current practice, the division of tax base at the interna-
tional level, generally is determined unilaterally by the process
19. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COM-
MITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND
CAPITAL C(23) 5-7 (1992).
20. See R. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Internation Equity, in MODERN
FISCAL ISSUES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 63 (R. M. Bird & J. G. Head
eds., University of Toronto Press 1972).
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of separate accounting applied to separate business entities,
with profits derived from actual or notional arms-length pric-
ing and accounting practices of one country; often in conflict
with those of others.21 With business operations integrated in
various ways across borders, the untangling of profits and
their assignment to different jurisdictions of source becomes an
artificial exercise and rules-of-thumb measures often have to
be adopted. Furthermore, this practice lends itself to profit
shifting by the taxpayer. Most fundamentally, rules are needed
to assign an equitable share by the countries of source in the
income accruing to multi-national corporations. Common
source rules employing unitary combination and uniform for-
mula apportionment are needed to avoid arbitrary and preda-
tory practices for determining source.22 Furthermore, with the
prevalence of highly integrated business operations, there is no
single formula based on economic theory alone which correctly
can be claimed to assign income to source. Consequently, it is
necessary to adopt a formula which, by mutual international
agreement, generally is acceptable for reasons of fairness. For
instance, one possible formula among many might contain
elements which measure on the supply side each country's
share of the firm's factors of production, such as labor and
capital, and on the demand side its contribution to the firm's
sales.2 Whichever formula is adopted, it is critical that there
be international agreement on its general adoption. 4
2. Rate of Tax
The rate of tax applied at source also should be a matter
of international agreement and again be based on a standard
of inter-nation equity. An obvious rule would call for interna-
tionally equal rates of tax on income accruing to non-residents.
Bilateral tax treaties usually call for such reciprocally equal
rates to be applied to withholding taxes, but profits taxes are
21. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT (OECD), TAXING PROFITS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1991).
22. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax
Base, in THE STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAX: IssuES IN WORLDWIDE UNITARY
COMBINATION (C.E. McLure, Jr. ed., Hoover Institution Press 1984).
23. See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 20 (discussing the possibilities).
24. Experience with attempts to reach uniformity of formula apportionment
among the states in the U.S. is not encouraging.
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held to be subject to a rule of non-discrimination whereby
resident and non-resident taxpayers should be subject to the
same rate of tax. However, for this standard of inter-nation
equity to be met, reciprocity should apply to such taxes in
combination with withholding taxes. The rates applied to resi-
dent corporations are governed by domestic tax policy consider-
ations such as taxpayer equity and economic growth, whereas
those applied to non-residents should be determined by the
appropriate share of their income earned at source; a share
which is set by international agreement and applies to all
source countries. Clearly, the usual treaty requirements of
non-discrimination with respect to the corporate income tax
combined with reciprocity of withholding tax rates is unsatis-
factory with respect to inter-nation equity. If, for administra-
tive or other reasons, the non-discrimination rule must apply
to the corporation income tax, then withholding tax rates on
the remitted income might be adjusted to yield, in combination
with the profits tax rate, an internationally agreed rate. Thus,
if country S's statutory rate of corporate tax is 25 percent, and
the internationally agreed rate is 30 percent, then S's permit-
ted withholding rate (WT) would be obtained from the equation
.30 = .25 WT(1.0 - .25)} or 6.7 percent. If, on the other hand,
country S's corporate rate were 40 percent, its withholding rate
would be negative, calling for a refund rate of 1.7 percent.
C. Neutrality
While the exercise of source entitlement involves the claim
by the source country on the income accruing to non-resi-
dent-and is a matter of inter-nation equity which must be
resolved by international agreement-that of residence sover-
eignty determines the ultimate tax burden which is borne by
its resident corporations with investments abroad. Allocative
efficiency, as it applies to foreign investment, requires a situa-
tion of international tax neutrality whereby investors of a
country face the same tax rate whether they choose to invest
at home or abroad. This can be achieved with the use of the
foreign tax credit, with a refund if the foreign tax exceeds the
resident country's tax on the same income, and without defer-
ral of tax until income is repatriated. While this situation of
"capital export neutrality," as it has been termed,25 is needed
25. A term coined by R.A Musgrave. See R.A. Musgrave, Criteria for Foreign
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SOVEREIGNTY, ENTITLEMENT
for allocative efficiency," it requires some sacrifice on the
part of the residence, or capital-exporting country, in the inter-
est of worldwide welfare. Capital outflow will be larger and tax
revenue will be less than if country R pursued a tax policy
designed to serve only its national economic interests. Coopera-
tion is thus required of the residence country in the interest of
international welfare, just as cooperation is required of the
source countries in the interest of inter-nation equity.
D. Shareholder Versus Corporation
While cooperative agreements among nations are neces-
sary to secure efficient allocation of international capital and
inter-nation equity, there is no reason why individual taxpayer
equity need he surrendered in the process. It was noted earlier
that it is possible to take different views of taxpayer equity,
each calling for different treatment of the foreign tax. The
standard of "international" equity would call for the foreign tax
to be treated as the domestic tax on the same income, and this
view is consistent with the foreign tax credit approach. This
treatment for foreign-source corporate income is not only nec-
essary to secure a neutral tax treatment for investment, but
also (taking the "international" equity approach) to preserve
equity for individual shareholders by equalizing the underlying
corporate tax on shareholders' dividends. In the same spirit, if
dividends are distributed directly from a foreign subsidiary to
the resident shareholder, country R's corporate tax should be
interposed with a credit for foreign tax before the dividends
are taxed to the individual shareholder.27
If a residence country for domestic purposes applies a
partial or full integration of corporate and personal income
taxes, international cooperative agreements of the kind dis-
cussed in this paper would allow such a country to decide for
itself whether the foreign corporate tax on income earned
abroad should be integrated with the domestic personal income
Tax Credit, in TAXATION AND OPERATIONS ABROAD (Tax Institute Symposium
1959).
26. See Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxing Multinationals with Portfolio
Flows and R & D: Is Capital Export Neutrality Obsolete?, 2 INT'L.TAX & PUB. FIN.
439 (1995) (discussing an efficiency-based defense of the policy of capital export
neutrality).
27. This follows the French "avoire faire" system.
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tax on shareholders. Preservation of tax sovereignty of the
residence countries over the degree of integration chosen is
compatible with the cooperative rules outlined. This has been a
matter discussed in connection with the principle of
"subsidiarity" in the European Union.'
E. Administrative Cooperation
It goes without saying that there are considerable adminis-
trative difficulties to be faced in implementing a cooperative
model, as outlined above, and cooperation among national tax
administrations including exchange of information would be
vital to its success.
V. HIGHER LEVELS OF COOPERATION
It is likely that in the absence of cooperative agreements
both source and residence countries will exercise their
entitlements in a way to serve their national interests and that
these interests may conflict with each other and with stan-
dards of inter-nation equity and allocative efficiency. The pres-
ent international tax regime is deficient in these respects de-
spite an extensive network of tax treaties. A higher degree of
cooperation is necessary in the interests of an orderly, just,
and efficient international tax regime which comes closer to
meeting these criteria. Whereas the question of inter-nation
equity has to be resolved among the source countries, interna-
tional efficiency in resource allocation is a standard deter-
mined by the policies applied by the residence countries. Cre-
ation of an international tax order of the kind outlined calls for
a high degree of international cooperation, analogous to that
leading to international agreements on trade liberalization.
This process might begin with design of an improved model tax
treaty since model treaties currently in use leave much to be
desired.
The process would be facilitated if responsibility for the
corporation income tax were acquired by central authorities of
groups of countries forming free trade areas, or economic un-
28. "Subsidiarity" is a term used to denote the degree of independence of
member nations permissible within the rules of harmonization, in the spirit of
permitting a maximum degree of tax diversity among member states consistent
with the goals of tax harmonization.
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ions (e.g., European Union), which could negotiate agreements
to set source rules and common rates of tax. Member countries,
as countries of residence, would then be free to set their own
rules governing the relation between their personal income
taxes on resident shareholders and the corporation income tax
on profits whether earned within or outside the union."s
Ultimately, many of the foregoing problems associated
with the establishment of a reasonable international tax order
may call for an international tax administration of the corpora-
tion income tax, imposed at a uniform rate. This would meet
the efficiency criterion; although the primary task of such an
administration would be the distribution of corporate tax reve-
nue among source countries according to a single mutually
acceptable formula, a procedure followed in some federal sys-
tems today."
Looking to the coming new millennium, it can be expected
that corporations will become ever more internationalized with
interlocking relationships both in operations and ownership.
Electronic commerce and the rapid transmission of funds
across borders will further complicate the task of tax adminis-
tration and enforcement. It may well be that these continuing
developments eventually will compel the transfer of national
responsibility for the corporation income tax to- an internation-
al authority. Nevertheless, if the revenue is to be returned to
source, this again will require cooperation in selection of an
equitable distribution formula.
A. International Aspects of Consumption Taxation: A Brief
Note3
l
The leading tax debate in recent years concerned the mer-
its of broad-based consumption taxes as compared with the
traditional income tax." Although U.S. interest in substitu-
29. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation:
Principles and Applications to the European Union, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM (S. Cnossen ed., Oxford
University Press 2000).
30. For example, Germany and Canada.
31. This concluding section is based (in summary form) on the following pa-
pers: Peggy B. Musgrave, International Coordination Problems of Substituting Con-
sumption for Income Taxation, in HEIDELBERG CONGRESS ON TAXING CONSUMPTION
453 (M. Rose ed., 1990). See also Musgrave, supra note 15.
32. See DAVID F. BRADFORD ET AL., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (2nd
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tion of consumption for income taxation has more recently
declined, it well may be revived in the future. Several, specific
proposals have been made in the United States to replace the
corporation and personal income taxes with consumption taxes.
They include familiar devices such as a retail sales or value-
added tax," as well as new approaches. Variously named
cash-flow taxes, individual prepayment tax, the Unlimited
Savings Allowance (USA) tax, 34 and the Flat Rate Tax,3 of-
fer a complex and sometimes confusing pattern.36 My purpose
here is not to compare the taxes with respect to their equity
properties, but briefly to assess the international implications
of a substitution of such broad-based consumption taxes for the
corporation and personal income taxes. This will be viewed in
terms of the foregoing discussion, in which sovereignty, entitle-
ment, and cooperation were considered as the leading issues in
international taxation within the traditional context of income
taxation.
B. Nature of Entitlements with Consumption Taxation
The residence, and source countries' entitlement to tax is
now defined in terms of consumption rather than income. As a
residence country, tax sovereignty now applies to the world-
wide consumption of its residents. Origin of consumption goods
now substitutes for the source of income as a geographic-based
tax entitlement. Analogous to income tax entitlements, con-
sumption tax entitlements call for a personal expenditure tax
on individuals and an in rem tax on consumption at origin, the
latter met by a consumption-type value-added tax applied on
the origin principle.
ed., Tax Analysts 1984).
33. See CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., THE VALUE-ADDED TAX: KEY TO DEFICIT
REDUCTION? 1-2 (American Enterprise Institute 1987).
34. See generally Alliance USA, USA Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1481 (1995).
35. See generally ROBERr E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAx (2nd
ed., The Hoover Institution 1995).
36. The plans are surveyed in Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George Zodrow, Ad-
vantages of a Hybrid Direct Tax on Cdnsumption, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 88TH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION (National Tax Association 1996).
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C. Comparison of Principal Consumption Tax Proposals
The three major consumption taxes (value-added tax, USA
tax, and Flat tax), under discussion in the U.S., differ some-
what in the composition of their bases and in turn on how they
fit in with the two entitlements outlined above.
1. Value-Added Tax (VAT)
Beginning with the familiar consumption-type value-added
tax, the firm's base equals sales minus purchases of inputs
from other firms, minus purchase of capital equipment. If the
tax is aimed at production at origin, exports are included and
imports excluded from the base; if aimed at consumption at
destination, exports are excluded and imports included in the
base. As an in rem tax, the VAT is appropriate as an instru-
ment for exercising the consumption entitlement at origin. At
the same time, the tax does not fulfill the role of exercising
residence sovereignty via a personal consumption tax.
2. USA Tax
Under the USA or "Unlimited Savings Allowance" plan, a
tax would apply at both the business and the personal level. At
the business level, the corporation income tax would be re-
placed by a "business tax." This tax no longer would be aimed
at profits. Instead, it would have a cash flow base which equals
sales receipts less purchase of materials and equipment. Wage
payments and imports are included in the base but exports are
excluded. Thus, the business component of the tax is similar to
a consumption-based, value-added tax of the destination type.
But, since exports are excluded, this component of the tax falls
short of meeting the origin entitlement role. The USA tax also
includes a personal consumption tax component the base of
which equals income receipts from all domestic sources (includ-
ing wage and capital income) less savings measured as the
increase in net worth held in qualifying assets. However, for-
eign-source income and the change in value of foreign net
worth are not included in the base, and thus it does not allow
the exercise of residence sovereignty. In combination, although
the USA tax provides for consumption taxation in both in rem
and personal form, it falls short of meeting either entitlement
requirement.
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3. Flat Tax
The Flat Tax plan again offers taxation at both the busi-
ness and personal levels. The base of the business tax now
differs from a value-added tax by excluding wage and salary
income, which then becomes the base of the personal tax. Fur-
thermore, unlike the USA tax, the tax includes exports and
excludes imports, and thus has an origin rather than destina-
tion base. Although the in rem business component is origin-
based, it is again defective in meeting origin entitlement be-
cause of the wage exclusion. At the personal level, only domes-
tic-source wages and salaries are included in the base. The
Flat Tax, therefore, fails to implement residence sovereignty
over worldwide consumption.
Moving from an income-based to a consumption-based tax
system would mean first of all an abandonment of the income-
based source and residence principles. In other words, the
adopting country would fail to exercise its entitlement to tax
income of non-resident corporations and individuals which
have a domestic source, and surrender its tax sovereignty over
worldwide income of its residents. In its place, adoption of any
of the three above plans would allow exercise only partially, or
not at all, of a country's entitlement to tax consumption associ-
ated with trade flows and cross-border shopping. This loss
might be corrected partly by abrogation of the tax treaties to
which it is a signatory and by reversion to a high withholding
tax on income paid to foreign recipients. However, this would
represent a cumbersome combination of consumption and in-
come tax bases, and in any case treaty partners are not likely
to accept such a violation of existing treaty terms without
retaliation.
D. International Economic Aspects of Substitution
Moving from an income to a consumption base also would
affect trade and capital flows, but the outcome would differ
somewhat under the three plans."
Introduction of a destination-type value-added tax would
be neutral with respect to trade flows since the tax would
37. See Musgrave, supra note 15 (providing a fuller analysis specifically con-
cerning the U.S. case).
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apply equally to imported and domestically-produced consump-
tion goods. An origin-type value-added tax, on the contrary,
would interfere with trade flows at least in the short run until
depreciation of the currency restored neutrality. However,
substitution of a value-added tax could be expected to have a
substantial effect on international flows of direct investment.
Bearing in mind that if capital exporting countries tax capital
income on the source principle only, this leaves foreign invest-
ment by their residents to be taxed by the host country alone.
With the host tax on corporate profits now abolished and the
consumption-type value-added tax imposing a zero tax on such
income, foreign investors may be expected to respond to the
strong tax advantage gained by investing in the consumption-
tax economy. The country substituting consumption for income
taxation would become an attractive tax haven for new incom-
ing investment, and provide large windfalls (unless somehow
prevented by transitional arrangements) to existing invest-
ments owned by non-residents. At the same time, resident
investors would be deterred from investing abroad due to
strong differentials between the rates of foreign source-based
income taxes and the home country's zero rate. Without re-
sponse from other capital-importing and capital-exporting
countries, the expectation would be for a substantial shift in
international flows of direct investment away from foreign
countries and towards the country introducing the substitu-
tion.
Turning to the Flat Tax, trade flows would now be affected
since the combined business and wage components of the Flat
Tax resembles the origin type VAT. With exports included and
imports excluded from the base, there would be a balance of
trade effect. This trade effect would be absent in the case of
the USA tax, but there also would remain distorting effects on
capital flows similar to those under the value-added tax pro-
posal. Activities by those companies operating abroad would
not be subject to the tax, but those by foreign companies oper-
ating in the country are taxable. Similarly, wages and salaries
earned abroad by residents would not be subject to tax, while
earnings by non-residents in the U.S. would be taxed. Since
only abnormal profits would be subject to tax, with normal
profits exempt, most of the tax burden on capital, the more
internationally mobile factor of production, will be shifted to
labor, the less mobile factor. Unless other countries were to
20011 1353
BROOK. J. INTL L.
take measures to neutralize them, wide disparities in tax rates
would result in inefficient mnisallocations of capital. It also
would further encourage capital flight from developing and
transitional economies (already now fostered in the U.S. case
by the failure to tax interest paid abroad), and discourage
investment into these countries.
In all, it may be concluded that unilateral substitution of
the consumption taxes for the income tax would have major
distorting effects on capital flows but only minor effects, limit-
ed to the Flat Tax, on commodity flows. Other countries might
respond by making domestic investment more attractive to
their resident investors via taxing corporate-source income at a
lower rate, with a compensating increase in the tax on other
income types. Such a response may be characterized as a form
of tax competition set in motion by a radical tax change in one
country.
It is obvious that with one country adopting a consump-
tion-based tax system, while taxation in other countries re-
mains largely income-based, that inter-nation equity becomes
problematical. The country using a broad-based consumption
tax would lay claim to but a minor share of income accruing to
non-residents compared with other income tax-based countries.
E. Need for Cooperative Coordination
The consequences of one country adopting consumption
taxation in isolation is likely to result in strong non-neutrali-
ties in the international allocation of capital leading to tax
competition, particularly if that country is a large supplier of
that capital, together with a departure from any semblance of
inter-nation equity. In considering what possibilities there are
for cooperative agreements to mitigate these problems, there is
the question of how, in an economically interdependent world,
tax systems based on different paradigms of entitlement (in-
come and consumption) can be coordinated. Unfortunately, use
of the two systems of taxation creates a fiscal disconnect that
is not readily bridged by coordinating measures."
There are no ready coordinating measures by which to
38. See Peggy B. Musgrave, International Coordination Problems of Substitut-
ing Consumption for Income Taxation, in HEIDELBERG CONGRESS ON TAXING CON-
SUA TION 453 (M. Rose ed., 1990).
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restore neutrality in capital flows while also protecting revenue
entitlements. Assertion of their tax sovereignty by the income-
tax countries via the residence principle or imposition of a high
withholding tax by the consumption tax country would deal
with distorting capital inflow to the latter, but not with its tax
deterrent to capital outflow. To deal with resident-owned capi-
tal, the consumption tax country would need to apply an in-
come tax to its capital located abroad, thereby abrogating the
shift to a consumption base. Restoring efficiency to capital
flows via coordinating measures would thus be difficult or
impossible in the mixed system, especially so while also main-
taining the exercise of two different sets of entitlement.
This difficulty would disappear, however, if all countries
were to adopt a consumption base. While this paper has fo-
cused on the implications of a unilateral substitution, a con-
cluding look at a global system of consumption taxation may be
mentioned briefly here. Under such a system, coordination not
only would be feasible, but appears simpler than in the income
tax setting. The problem of coordinating the taxation of capital
income would disappear with the abolition of tax on capital
income. However, a need for coordination would remain if the
consumption base is applied in the context of a personalized
expenditure tax. In that case, inclusion of residents' foreign
financial transactions would be a crucial condition for securing
a comprehensive tax base and this hardly could be done with-
out cooperation from abroad. The substitution also would affect
greatly the extent to which various countries can derive tax
revenue in the international arena. The ability to reach domes-
tic income of foreign-owned capital would be traded against the
ability to tax foreign consumers of domestically-produced ex-
ports. This trade well may be to the disadvantage of developing
countries and may call for compensatory revenue transfers.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident that replacement of the income tax system by
broad-based consumption taxes would eliminate the source
country's ability to share in the income gains derived by for-
eign factors from operation within its borders. Even though
there has been a tendency to present the plans as "taxing all
income alike," this gives a misleading impression. The taxation
of capital income largely is voided by allowance for expensing
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and the systems should be seen as consumption taxes. As such,
they do not permit a significant exercise of the entitlement
rule. At the same time, unilateral replacement of consumption
for income taxation would (a) abandon tax sovereignty over the
allocation of domestic resources, (b) greatly worsen existing
non-neutralities in the tax treatment of domestic and foreign
investment, and (c) set off a round of international tax compe-
tition, with particularly damaging effects on developing coun-
tries.
For all the above reasons, and whatever the merits of the
substitution might be for a closed economy, these merits do not
extend to an open economy heavily engaged in a global capital
market.
